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More than thirty-five years after World War 11, Vitomir JankoviC, a janitor in the 
Bosnian town of Odiak, passed away. He was well known for having participated 
in a massacre of Muslims in November 1941 and was distrusted among his Serb 
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neighbors for allegedly informing on fellow partisans months later. Still, JankoviC 
was something of a local operator, so news of his death traveled quickly. Avdo 
Celik, the son of one of his Muslim victims, heard about it while visiting Sarajevo. 
He immediately bought a postcard and sent it to the family: "My congratulations 
on Vitomir JankoviC's death like a dog." It was ten years before Avdo received a 
reply. "Best regards" was all that had been written by JankoviC's son, Mile, who, 
as ethnic warfare escalated in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, had killed Avdo's 
cousins in nearby ViSegrad and thrown their bodies into the Drina River. This 
instance of strife between families across generations is familiar but hardly 
straightforward. Is it evidence of long-standing ethnic conflicts that get played out 
over and again? Is it the afterlife of the horrors of World War II? Or is it the 
opportunism of local vendettas? To make sense of the relations between the Celiks 
and JankoviCs and thus to respond to the Yugoslav crisis is to make a judgment 
about the role of collective memory in social and political life. Just how critical 
such a judgment is has been made plain by the rush to discem and then to dismiss 
the "Balkan ghosts" conjured up by Robert Kap1an.l This article will attempt to 
review the historical literature on these and other ghosts and on the structures of 
temporality that have made ghostly appearances and disappearances possible. 
While my initial point of departure is Yugoslavia, the focus of the article is on the 
modem context of the "memory crisis," and more specifically on the imagination 
of a collective but imperiled national past bounded in time and space, as well as 
on the reconfiguration of private life and private remembrance in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
To Chuck Sudetic, whose rich account follows the lives of the Celiks and Jankov- 
iCs, the killings in the 1990s exemplified "a cult of the dead, a world where living 
memories and bedtime stories merged history into the landscape itself." Sudetic 
joins many other well-informed observers for whom the "deadly myths" of Serbian 
or, for that matter, Croatian nationhood constituted the "deep structure" of the 
Yugoslav t r a g e d ~ . ~  The plausible assumption at work here is that national myths 
embedded in collective memory made ethnic partisans out of village neighbors. In 
the best popular account of the Serbs, for example, Tim Judah identifies the serial 
nature of "village burning, massacres, and flight" and structures his narrative as a 
series of repetitions: 1804, 1876-78, 1912-13, 1941-45, 1991-95. Such a view, 
Judah concedes, may be "politically incorrect" because it traps his subjects in 
history and makes their crimes appear inevitable. Judah nonetheless insists on the 
I Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through Histop (New York, 1993). For critical but 
related responses, see Steven R. Weisman, "Coming to Terms with Kosovo's 'Old' Hatreds," New 
York Times (June ?2, 1999); and David Remnick, "The Black Page," New Yorker (June 14, 1999). 
On JankoviC and Celik, see Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family's S top  of the War 
in Bosnia (New York, 1998), pp. 63, 219. Charles King ties the vignette together in his review, 
"Shallow Graves," Times Literap Supplement (October 2, 1998), p. 34. 
Sudetic, p. xxxi. 
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force of collective myths and the vitality of group memories. "When you talk to 
these people," he approvingly quotes the nineteenth-century Serb writer Ljubomir 
NenadoviC, "you have the impression that the Battle of Kosovo took place yester- 
day." Insightful commentators such as Roger Cohen, who follows the saga of 
several families in Sarajevo; Marcus Tanner, who writes about Croatia; and Robert 
Kaplan, the title of whose book-Balkan Ghosts-neatly summarizes his thesis, 
underscore the extent to which ordinary people carried about in daily life a "vis- 
ceral sense of the past."' (In sum, these books also testify to immensely productive, 
satisfying traffic between historians and journalists.) 
The transformation of Yugoslavia's past into an extended ever-recurring present 
was first scrutinized by Rebecca West, whose 1941 study still assumes an authen- 
ticating presence. "I would have rather lost my passport and money than my 
heavily thumbed and annotated copy of [West's] Black Lamb and Grey Falcon," 
remarks Kaplan, and the influence is manifest4 West was enchanted with Yugo- 
slavia because she found it a "land where everything was comprehensible." It had 
the "blissful clarity" Roland Barthes found in myth, which works to make "things 
appear to mean something by themselves." West's East is a place where people 
played out a historical drama that had been taking place for centuries, and she 
considered Yugoslavs richer for it. She had no trouble identifying the individuals 
she met as players of Serb, Croat, and Turkish parts in that grand dramatization. 
Even the diners in a restaurant in Senj were ethnic representatives first; when a 
patron shouted out objections to cold soup, West knew that "he was not shouting 
at the soup. He was shouting at the Turks, at the Venetians, at the Austrians, at the 
French and at the Serbs (if he was a Croat) or at the Croats (if he was a Serb). It 
was good that he shouted"; his "forefathers had survived because they had the 
power to shout, to reject cold soup." Yugoslavia is strikingly transparent, to West 
and to the country's inhabitant^.^ 
The view that collective myths are at work shaping social identities is to be 
taken very seriously, and their power to explain political motivations, national 
cohesion, and ethnic massacres will remain in focus. But, as the escapade in West's 
restaurant might suggest, there are problems with the assumption that historical 
subjects always act out long-standing collective traditions: soup is sometimes cold. 
Three sorts of objections have been leveled. The use of the idea of the collective 
myth obscures its own historical origins; it silences other social identities; and it 
misunderstands the opportunistic deployment of this idea by elites. The first ob- 
T i m  Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, Conn., 
1997), pp. 15, 65; Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas of Sarajevo (New York, 1998), p. 
xvi; Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, Conn., 1997); and Kaplan, 
Balkan Ghosts. 
Kaplan, p. 8. 
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annene Lavers (New York, 1972), pp. 142-43; Rebecca 
West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (London, 1941; reprint, New York, 1982), pp. 1, 128. The 
conception of the transparency of history and of the past is effectively analyzed by way of Greek 
examples in David E. Sutton, Memories Cast in Stone: The Relevance of the Past in Evepday 
Life (Oxford, 1998). Incidentally, Sunon anticipates me and makes excellent use of sharply dif- 
fering opinions on Yugoslavia to make sense of one Greek community's historical consciousness. 
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jection locates the origins of social allegiances in historical circumstances. After 
all, Serbs, Croats, and Albanians did not imagine themselves to be cohorts of 
distinct national entities until the middle of the nineteenth century. And even as 
ancient history was subsequently rewritten in the nationalist mode, twentieth-cen- 
tury wars hardened and legitimized exclusive national allegiances. Indeed, the 
reference point to which so many Yugoslav witnesses return again and again in 
these reports is the very particular, traumatic experience of World War 11, in which, 
we know, Vitomir JankoviC killed Hasan celik, and in which the Ustashe-run 
Croatian state "intended to exterminate the Serb population and failed only because 
it lacked the means"; as it was, as many as 1 million Serbs were massacred in 
Croatia. So much of the century was organized by the war: the "rediscoveries of 
World War I1 dead helped to ignite warfare in 1991," explains Katherine Verdery, 
"which yielded still other bodies in mass graves, sources of recrimination that 
fueled the wars f~ r t he r . "~  That it was World War I1 that destroyed five of the eleven 
arches of "the bridge on the Drina" at ViSegrad, the "unchanged and unchangeable" 
endurance of which over the preceding three centuries provided the novelist Ivo 
AndriC a symbol for the ability of townspeople to forget their misfortunes and to 
live with one another, well expresses the special force with which the recent history 
of war acted on Yugoslav political life7 
The second objection takes a closer look at individual families and social net- 
works to reveal a much more complicated picture that is otherwise effaced by 
emphasis on ethnic affiliation. In his absorbing account of several Sarajevo fami- 
lies, Roger Cohen makes clear that a distinctive Yugoslavian-as opposed to Serb 
or Croatian-identity had a pull of its own. In the 1960s and 1970s young people 
increasingly thought of themselves as Yugoslav and inscribed themselves in the 
census as such; they shared recollections of the common burdens of military ser- 
vice or memories of the 1984 Sarajevo O l ymp i c~ . ~  The frequency of mixed mar- 
riages undermined the comprehensive claims of ethnicity as well. Cohen displays 
these mixtures in the photographs that everybody saved: "The company photo- 
graph. The football-club photograph. The school photograph. . . . The friends who 
met every Sunday to go fishing, or hunting, or skiing." When the 1991 war started, 
Cohen argues, people "still thought in the same way; their frame of reference . . . 
was still those photographs." However, the continuation of the war and the extent 
and brutality of its violence irreparably damaged interethnic relations. Cohen tells 
the sad story of twentieth-century war: "For Hans and Bisera and Fida and Asim 
in Sarajevo-and Slobodan, Jasna, and Vesna in Belgrade-it became harder and 
harder to recall the world that had once placed them in the same photographic 
Tanner, p. 153; Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of the Dead: Reburial and Postsocialist 
Change (New York, 1999), p. 97. See also Robert M. Hayden, "Recounting the Dead: The Re- 
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1994),pp. 167-84. 
' Ivo AndriC, The Bridge on the Drina, introduction by William H. McNeill (Chicago, 1977), 
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frame." Indeed, a common sight outside the homes abandoned by displaced ref- 
ugees was the litter of photos and albums that the new owners had thrown out. 
This trash was evidence not so much for different histories (Muslim rathzr than 
Serb) than for different kinds of histories (private rather than collective). Cohen 
recognizes the stark validity of collective myths during the Bosnian war, when 
Serbs sought refuge with Serbs, Muslims with Muslims, but he does not regard 
them as vital forces in the messiness of daily life before the war.9 
Finally, a number of observers so effectively dismantle the twisted national 
histories of the Serbs and Croats and, to a lesser extent, of the Albanians that they 
argue for the spuriousness not only of the claims of myths but also of their appeal. 
The best and bravest effort is Noel Malcolm's. In a remarkable analysis of the 
history of Kosovo, Serbia's largely Albanian province, Malcolm demolishes one 
Serb myth after another: the lineup of Albanian against Serb in the Battle of Ko- 
sovo in 1389; the long-standing Serb attachment to Kosovo; the alien and destruc- 
tive nature of Ottoman rule; the recent arrival of Kosovo's Albanian population. 
Malcolm goes on to argue that Kosovo's Serbs and Albanians lived together re- 
markably peacefully well into the nineteenth century and that, despite rising ten- 
sions, less rather than more collective violence took place in the region during the 
two world wars. Of course, Malcolm knows that invented traditions are no less 
strong for being fictitious and that historians' evidence means little in the face of 
general belief. Nonetheless, Malcolm finds so little complicity of ordinary neigh- 
bors in harsh ethnic politics-and even points out that in the 1970s and 1980s the 
incidence of interethnic rape was lower in Kosovo than in the rest of Serbia-that 
he goes on to argue that the myths themselves were illusory, little more than the 
opportunistic creatures of Russian consuls in Prishtina and Mitrovica in the nine- 
teenth century and "a few Serbian politicians" in the twentieth.I0 Even if readers 
do not accept Malcolm's final conclusion, his argument for the historical contin- 
gency and fragile nature of collective myth is difficult to dismiss. 
The political commentary generated by the Yugoslav crisis reveals what is at 
stake in historiographical debates about social identity and collective memory. The 
wars in Bosnia and Kosovo pose fundamental questions regarding the strength and 
endurance of national or ethnic memories, the nature of the relations between 
officially sanctioned and private or vernacular memories, and the long-lasting ef- 
fect of specific traumatic events arising out of World War 11. Memories are a 
problem because scholars still do not understand how they tie individuals to 
groups; nor do they agree whether those ties are somehow archaic or, in fact, quite 
modem. Moreover, while outside commentators often assume that there is too 
much memory in the Balkans and consequently regard their work of critical de- 
construction as so many steps toward mutual understanding, political leaders them- 
selves fear the disappearance of collective memory and exhort followers not to 
forget. In either case, memory is regarded as a problem because it is in need of 
readjustment in order to create or sustain particular political possibilities. Finally, 
Cohen, pp. 269, 158. 
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the guiding assumption that collective memories are constructed or constructable 
raises vexing questions about the historical contexts and the structures of tempo- 
rality that make such construction work possible. While a great deal of scholarly 
activity has gone into analyzing the politics of commemoration, the selective screen 
of memory, and the privileged status of certain narratives about the past, there has 
been less sustained effort to comprehend the source of the anxiety surrounding 
collective memory, the reasons why certain links with the past are cultivated, the 
role of remembering in the modem world, or, for that matter, the grounds for the 
sudden academic preoccupation with memory. 
For Pierre Nora, who has invited the most sustained considerations of memory 
and history in the ambitious and, I think, truly remarkable volumes Les l i e u  de 
mimoire, which he edited over the years 1984-92 and large selections of which 
have now been translated, the definitive mark of the modem age is the absence of 
the kinds of ghosts that allegedly haunt the Balkans. In the much quoted intro- 
duction to the project, Nora develops two parallel arguments, which even as they 
tend to get in each other's way insist on a radically disenchanted and desacralized 
world. In his first thesis, Nora draws a sharp distinction between an age of memory, 
which has passed, and an age of history, in which we currently live. "The equilib- 
rium between the present and the past is disrupted," he maintains, so that "things 
tumble with increasing rapidity into an irretrievable past"; "the warmth of tradi- 
tion," "the silence of custom," and "the repetition of the ancestral" are no longer 
present as a result of the acceleration of time, in which the future has colonized 
the present with the settlements of the new. What has replaced the self-evident 
authority of tradition is a self-conscious historical sensibility that is premised on 
the knowledge of the demolition of tradition. "Memory is constantly on our lips," 
Nora writes, "because it no longer exists"; lieux de me'moire mark out vanished 
milieux de mimoire (1: 1). This fundamental rift has been accompanied by the loss 
of the unselfconscious cohesion of a "living society" and by the conscious work 
of historical reconstruction. "Lieux de mimoire arise out of a sense that there is 
no such thing as spontaneous memory, hence that we must create archives, mark 
anniversaries, organize celebrations" (1:3). These cultural productions conjure up 
past romances but withhold an authentic link to them; they have become substitutes 
for imagination. Nora's modem age is radically disenchanted and characterized by 
feeble efforts to reenchant itself. Just when this rupture took place is not clarified 
by Nora, but his sturdy artisanal metaphors suggest that he has in mind the onset 
of the industrial revolution and the sustained movement from the countryside to 
the city, which suggests sometime in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
In the same pages, Nora makes a parallel, more parochially French argument 
structured along the same axis of possession and loss. What is eventually lost 
according to this second account is the "memory nation," corresponding to the 
Third Republic (1870- 1940), which enabled an "intimate communion" between 
history and memory around the concept of the French nation. All the practices that 
distinguished the counterfeit age of history in the first account-archives, com-
memorations, museums-serve to keep "memory . . . standing on its sanctified 
foundation" in the second(1:3). This memory is not something that is tenuously recov- 
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ered (the verb of choice in the first account); rather, it "remains" whole in the 
sacred space created by the nation. Professional historians, who in the first account 
embodied the dispossession of the past, serve in the second account "half as sol- 
diers, half as priests" to sustain the life force of national memory (1:s). While 
Nora's conceptualization grants the nation fabulous powers, in the writing of the 
individual chapters these are mostly visible in decay. The second half of the twen- 
tieth century shattered the vital memory and social union of the nation. Nora writes 
with the blunt edge of the gravedigger: France is no longer a stable subject, either 
on the world stage or amid the movements of mass consumption and identity 
politics. Indeed, the loss of the memory nation is so impoverishing at the end of 
the second account that it serves to sustain the bleak picture of the unattainability 
of memory set out at the beginning of the first. The trauma of the demise of the 
nation leads Nora to doubt its authenticity altogether.I1 
Loss plays such a dramatic, almost personal part in Nora's analysis that it pre- 
vents him from bringing the two parallel accounts together and providing a more 
plausible explanation for memory practices in the modem age. Responding to his 
first account, which was premised on the sharp distinction between memory and 
history, most critics have rejected Nora's naturalization of memory in the prehis- 
torical epoch and his desacralization of memory practices in the modem world. 
They argue that the distinction is altogether too sharp and relies on the dubious 
notion of an authentically whole past, which in turn renders inauthentic the dif- 
ferent kinds of meanings that contemporary actors have found in the past and thus 
dismisses their versions of the sacred.I2 As for the idea of the memory nation in 
the Third Republic, one critic has contended that Nora invests the loss of national 
identity after 1940 with so much poignancy that he overstates the consensus around 
the nation before 1940 and unreasonably privileges the civic virtue of the nation 
in contrast to that of "other groups" in society.I3 These critiques have great merit, 
but many of Nora's claims remain standing. As his history demonstrates so well, 
the notion that authentic memory had disappeared or that genuine national feeling 
had lapsed permeated nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought. It is not loss per 
se, but the sensibility of loss and the history of that sensibility, that needs to be 
examined more closely. Had Nora historicized the category of loss, he would have 
avoided making such grandiose claims for the authenticity of memory, the dis- 
possession of history, and the comity of the nation. Pierre Nora would not have 
kept slipping into his own primary sources. And yet I believe that Nora is quite 
aware of his lack of distance; he holds onto the loss of the nation rather than 
l 1  Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in Realms of Memory: 
The Construction of the French Past, ed. Pierre Nora, 3 vols. (New York, 1996-98), 1:l-20, and 
"The Era of Commemoration," in ibid., 3:612-37. 
l2  Susan A. Crane, "Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory," American Historical 
Review 102 (1997): 1372-85; Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and Na- 
tional Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), p. 7; Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan, "Introduction," in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Centuq ed. Jay Winter and 
Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 2-3. 
l 3  Steven Englund, "The Ghost of Nation Past," Journal of Modern History 64 (1992): 299- 
320. 
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elaborating an abstract history of the idea of the loss of the nation because he wants 
to reclaim for historians the roles of priest and soldier. These are performances I 
do not want to dismiss out of hand and will discuss below. For now, I propose to 
review narratives of loss before resuming a consideration of national and vernac- 
ular frames to collective memory. 
Nora's distinction between memory and history, which is mapped onto the divide 
between premodern and modem, is overly schematic but bears an affinity to the 
changing structures of temporality that have been examined by intellectual histo- 
rians such as Reinhart Koselleck and various literary scholars, including Richard 
Terdiman and James Chandler. In a series of exceptional essays published in 1985, 
Koselleck argued for the notion of modem time in which the last two or three 
hundred years have been identified by the continual iteration of the new and dif- 
ferent. In the early modern period, he explains, "the present and past were enclosed 
within a common historical plane" in which Renaissance figures believed them- 
selves to inhabit the same moral and political universe as their Greek and Roman 
forebears and called upon Classical examples to make sense of contemporary di- 
lemmas: Machiavelli's The Prince is the outstanding example. While seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century absolutist politics admitted a large number of variations, 
they were delimited by a comprehensible set of variables and motivations so that 
"history was comparatively static"; conceived in this way, Koselleck concludes, 
"nothing particularly new could happen."I4 The French Revolution and the coin- 
cident series of technological innovations finally exploded the logic of this history 
because these events drastically widened the gap between what Koselleck usefully 
identifies as the "horizon of expectation" and the "space of experience." According 
to Rudy Koshar, this sudden disjuncture became "the fundamental condition of 
societal relationships" in modern times; "anticipation of the future worked without 
deferring primarily to the authority of remembrance."15 By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Koselleck maintains, a modem structure of temporality was in 
place, one that admitted a new order of difference by imposing periodicity on 
linear time and recognizing the present as a state of transition to an uncertain future, 
and one that relied on an unprecedented standardization of historical experience: 
contemporaries increasingly shared an awareness of the eruption of new time and 
therefore could retrospectively endow events such as the French Revolution with 
universal significance. It was in the very casualness of references to recognizable 
markers such as "1789" or even "'89" that the new temporal order revealed itself. 
Longer-term processes such as the expansion of state control, the regularization 
of schooling and military service, and technologies of communication and trans- 
portation further enabled the synchronization of time over space.16 
I' Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, Mass., 
1985), pp. 4, 15. 
l5 Ibid., pp, 275-76; Koshar, p. 18. 
I h  On this theme, see Helga Nowotny, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience, trans. 
Neville Plaice (Cambridge, 1994),pp. 22-23. 
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The stress is on sensibility and perception, since Koselleck is tracking not ma- 
terial change itself but the imaginative categories that apprehended it. His premises 
have provided contemporary theorists invaluable components for a definition of 
modernity around the notion of "unrepeatable time."17 Koselleck's argument is 
also consistent with the exemplary analysis of Richard Terdiman, who provides a 
method for "historicizing memory" and "theorizing recollection." In Present Past, 
Terdiman argues that in the years that followed the French Revolution "people 
experienced the insecurity of their culture's involvement with its past, the pertur- 
bation of the link to their own inheritance," as "memory crisis: a sense that their 
past had somehow evaded memory, that recollection had ceased to integrate with 
consciousness." A disquiet about the status of the past corresponded to energetic 
efforts to make sense of the past, so that "the nineteenth century's preoccupation 
with the developmental character of time cannot be divorced from the disruptions 
of memory which underlay its theoretical concerns and determined their urgency." 
Terdiman covers much of the same ground as Nora, and he relies on the same 
basic rift at the turn of the nineteenth century: he plainly states that "loss is what 
makes our memory of the past possible at But Terdiman provides a more 
systematic, contextual account based on close readings of seminal cultural texts 
(Musset, Baudelaire, Freud, Proust); he insists that both historical method and the 
work of recollection are distinctly modem practices that arise out of the nineteenth 
century's memory crisis. Terdiman's analysis is exhilarating because he makes a 
compelling historical case for modem memory. 
The most sustained exploration of temporal identities in the nineteenth century 
also comes from a literary scholar. James Chandler's England in 1819 is an am- 
bitious, complex work that deserves a wide readership among historians. Prompted 
by a sonnet of Shelley, "England in 1819," which was written in the tumultuous 
year of the Peterloo massacre, Chandler wants to know what it means to represent 
England as a datable, specific case and to endow it with what LCvi-Strauss called 
"hot chronology." The argument is historical first. Along with Koselleck, Chandler 
identifies a fundamental break in the perception of time around 1800: "Where 
political debate in the 1790s tended to structure itself in terms of threshold dis- 
tinctions-reason/passion, libertylslavery, state of naturelstate of civil society, na- 
turelsecond nature-political debate after Waterloo tends to involve arguments 
about historical movements, historical necessities, epochs, and formations." Mil- 
lenarian concepts gave way to viewpoints that were aware of "the movement from 
one historical epoch to the next."19 Chandler gives Georg Lukacs the credit he 
"Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, 
Postmodernism (Durham, N.C., 1987), p. 13; Peter Osbome, The Politics of Time: Modernity and 
the Avant-Garde (London, 1995), p. xii. Koselleck's arguments echo those of Klaus Behrens, 
Friedrich Schlegels Geschichtsphilosophie (1794-1808): Ein Beitrag zur politischen Romantik 
(Tiibingen, 1984); Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimitat der Neuzeit (Frankfurt, 1966); David Low- 
enthal, The Past Is a Foreign Country (Cambridge, 1985); Georges Poulet, Studies in Human 
Time, trans. Elliott Coleman (Baltimore, 1956); and Rudolf Wendorff, Zeit und Kultur: Geschichte 
des Zeitbewusstseins in Europa (Opladen, 1980). 
l 8  Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca, N.Y.,1993), pp. 
3-4, 22, 24. 
l 9  James Chandler, England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic 
Historicism (Chicago, 1998), p.  24. 
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deserves for explaining the plausibility of this new historical specificity. Both the 
mass experience of the revolutionary wars and the explicitly political nature of the 
wars made it more likely that contemporaries would regard social fates in terms 
of historical circumstances and thus would reject a method of analysis that relied 
on outstanding individuals for one that examined the ordinary but historically 
situated men and women whom Lukics identified in Walter Scott's fiction. 
The recognition that cultural texts issue out of cultural texture had significant 
political implications as well. The premise that "the individuality of character is 
derived from the historical peculiarity of the age" not only resulted in the literary 
enfranchisement of Scott's characters but also set in motion an argument for rep- 
resenting the nation at large. Chandler exposes how the politics of literary repre- 
sentation and the emphasis on the particular case (i.e., "England in 1819") bear on 
political representation. This "age of the spirit of the age," as Chandler happily 
apostrophizes the period, disqualified a reliance on great leaders and imagined the 
particular case-what Scott called "la vie prive'en-of the people. Moreover, as 
Chandler points out, the ability of contemporaries to conceive of themselves as 
historical products of specific periods opened the way for them to think of them- 
selves as active agents. Thus, the "national operation of self-dating, or -redatingM 
also implied "national self-making, or -remaking." National narratives had the 
crucial effect of recognizing and validating the cultural particulars of citizens. The 
claims Chandler makes for narrative are extremely strong: "only through such a 
narrative construction," he argues, "does history find a way to make itself by 
itself."20 I find Chandler convincing when he proposes to treat Romantic histori- 
cism as a way of picturing the world and thereby enabling action in it. But Chan- 
dler, wary of losing the gains he has achieved with his New Historicist method, 
strains to keep the specific case of "England in 1819" from tumbling into a trans- 
national scheme. He insists somewhat extravagantly on the distinctly British con- 
text of his case, in which anxious engagement with both Scotland and the United 
States enhanced the potential for making the historically specific determinations 
that Chandler then extends in a series of brilliant moves to "the age of the spirit 
of the age" and to the case of his own fascination with 18 19 in 198 1. 
The historical consciousness that Koselleck, Terdiman, and Chandler identify 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century was based on the dramatization of dif- 
ference in time and space, allowing for the identification of distinct periods and 
milieus. At the same time, historical specificity held together a mutually recognized 
unity among cohorts. It became possible to think in terms of the integrity of a 
single generation in the nineteenth century in ways that were not possible in the 
eighteenth. Nora himself points out that it was not until after the French Revolution 
that "a group united by age and dominated by the revolutionary event discovered 
not just history as man's production of his own existence but also the power of 
collective action and social germination and the role of time in the unfolding 
historical process. This deep immersion in history is absolutely inseparable from 
the emergence of an active generational c~nsc iousness . "~~  Historical or epochal 
consciousness was thus premised on rupture and discontinuity in order to distin- 
Ibid., pp. 5, 78, 89, 149-50. 

2' Pierre Nora, "Generation." in Nora, ed., 1:515 
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guish the present period, and it postulated a shared recognition that this was so. 
While Chandler's argument is mostly exuberant and focuses on new literary and 
political possibilities of representing the nation, it accommodates a tragic vision 
of the perishability of the past. The past was increasingly characterized as some- 
thing it was not before-as a separate, distinct period that was irretrievably past. 
This new place constituted itself as a field for unprecedented activity: the nostalgic 
accounting of loss, anguished concerns about the ability to recall and remember, 
and imaginative renditions of what might have been. The claim for the specific 
modernity of familiar practices of remembering is compelling. Nonetheless, it 
tends to flatten out the emotional body of what came before and will be contested 
by historians of early modem Europe. 
The specificity of the case and the method of historicism led to a critical reali- 
zation that, as Terdiman puts it, "nothing is natural about our memories, that the 
past-the practices, the habits, the dates and facts and places, the very future of 
our existence-is an artifice, and one susceptible to the most varied and sometimes 
the most culpable manipulation^."^^ This was devastating knowledge because it 
made social constructions fragile and it questioned the very basis of identity. An- 
guished debates over the place of custom, tradition, and inheritance in daily life 
embellished the nineteenth-century "memory crisis." Yet the very self-conscious- 
ness by which the relations between the past and present were pictured also 
prompted contemporaries to refurbish customs and traditions presumed to be im- 
periled or lost. Suddenly, traces of the past were everywhere, and landscape became 
a rendition of a r c h a eo l ~gy . ~~  Both anxiety about the deprivation of memories and 
confidence in their renovation marked historical thinking in the nineteenth century. 
The social networks that Maurice Halbwachs regarded as constitutive of all, even 
the most personal memory, did not decline; they flourished, and as they did, the 
collective memories and social identities they fashioned grew more rather than less 
intense.24 
The specificity of the case and the method of historicism also help clarify the 
durable forms that remembering took. "Identity implies the notions of boundedness 
and homogeneity," explains Richard Handler, as he questions the usefulness of 
"identity" as a cross-cultural concept. Once in place, however, the very bound- 
edness of identity in time and place served to authenticate powerful national and 
personal subjectivities and to privilege their narratives. Both national history and 
autobiography gave unity, coherence, and priority to the particulars of time and 
place. "Nations are thought . . . to have definite historical origins . . . to be bounded 
in space, as indicated on current maps," observes Handler, and "nations are imag- 
ined to be internally homogeneous in terms of what is taken to be shared cultural 
content-the very stuff, as it were, of identity."25 In similar fashion, autobiograph- 
22 Terdiman, p. 3 1. 
23 See, e.g., Lowenthal. 
24 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York, 1980). and On Collective Memory 
(Chicago, 1992). See also Susan Crane, Collecting and Historical Consciousness in Early Nine- 
teenth-Century Germany (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), which was published too late for this review. 
25 Richard Handler, "Is 'Identity' a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?' in Commemorations: The 
Politics of National Identiv, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J., 1994), pp. 29-30. 
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ical acts are attempts-often quite labored-to locate and to maintain a coherent 
and particular individual identity. What is more, autobiography and other "hu- 
manitarian narratives" flourished when the specifics of the individual case were 
fleshed out in detail and were made to correspond with identifiable social or po- 
litical causes in a contextualization that encouraged envy and reflection on the 
"counternormative" aspects of experience on the part of writers and invited em- 
pathetic responses among readers.26 Without the construction of context, the case 
of the individual was moot. 
James Olney's searching account of the individual's narrative performances (his 
study focuses on Augustine, Rousseau, and Beckett) is pertinent to the study of 
nationalism. The narrative of autobiography is both extremely durable and sur- 
prisingly weak, and it is this tension that gives life writing its dynamic and urgency. 
According to Olney, "life writing," the "agonized search for self, through the mu- 
tually reflexive acts of memory and narrative, accompanied by the haunting fear 
that it is impossible from the beginning but also impossible to give over, is the 
very emblem of our time."27 Autobiography is a strong form because, as Olney 
cites Georges Gusdorf, it "is a second reading of experience, and it is truer than 
the first because it adds to experience itself consciousness of it." But it is also 
weak because narratives, whether or not they are written down, are constructed; 
they require repeated readjustments over time, and thus they incorporate the mem- 
ory of remembering and with it the knowledge of the partial, unstable, and ten- 
dentious nature of narrative. Olney invites a similar reading of national histories, 
which are durable because they make the past present. Enchanting the local land- 
scape and constituting commemorative calendars, the national past became, Alon 
Confino notes, "as intimate and authentic as the local, ethnic, and family past."28 
National feeling is not the compelling accumulation of group experiences over 
time; rather, it relies on the retrospective organization of events to achieve intimacy 
among strangers who claim to recognize and know about each other across space, 
who validate and pity the misfortunes of contemporaries, and who thereby make 
connections between their own fate and that of the nation. It must be said that, for 
all her worrisome enthusiasms, Rebecca West long ago put her finger exactly on 
the clarity that nationalism realized. At the same time, the history of the nation is 
frequently enough written in the injunctive mode and thereby inscribes its contin- 
gent origins in the text. National history exhorts citizens to remember and to com- 
memorate; envisions the nation's own demise in the absence of restorative action; 
and dramatizes the menace of countervailing religious, regional, and class alle- 
2b Mary Jo Maynes, Taking the Hard Road: Life Course in French and German Workers' 
Autobiographies in the Era of Industrialization (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), pp. 11-12; Thomas W. 
Laqueur, "Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative," in The New Cultural History, ed. 
Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), pp. 177. 195. On the way in which subjects are constituted 
by changing notions of the admissibility of evidence, see Joan Scott, "The Evidence of Experi- 
ence," Critical Inquiry 17 (1991): 773-97. 
*'James Olney, Memorj and Narrative: The Weave of Life Writing (Chicago, 1998), pp, xiv-
xv. 
2a Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," American 
Historical Review 102 (1 997): 1402. 
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giances. The nation has had the special ability to organize remembering because 
it appropriates and thus recognizes as exemplary the ordeals of its people in the 
struggle to constitute itself.29 This is the story that Nora tells so well. 
At the very end of Realms of Memory, Nora imagines the end of the era of com- 
memoration: "The tyranny of memory will have endured for only a moment-but 
it was our moment" (3:637). This assessment of negligibility in fact recuperates 
the modem role of memory that, contrary to Nora's initial banishment of memory 
to the prehistorical age, did indeed exercise "tyranny" over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As Nora and his collaborators show, memory cults flourished 
throughout the nineteenth century and gave shape and intimacy to the most im- 
portant of these, which was the nation. Nora himself points out that the "memory 
nation" of the Third Republic was built in the modem period: "It was the nineteenth 
century . . . that invented the 'France' of which this book is an inventory" (2:xii). 
This formulation is much truer to the evidence than Nora's claim later on for a 
"traditional French predeliction for memory" and an affinity between the French 
and the Jews, who, Nora repeatedly maintains, "survived throughout history as a 
'people of memory'" (3:xii). "What characterizes all these traditions is that they 
date from the nineteenth century," Nora explains, "even those whose roots can be 
traced back to much earlier times were revived and reformulated in the nineteenth 
century. The 'land' would not exist as such without the ruralist and protectionist 
movement of the late nineteenth century. The 'cathedral' would not exist without 
the re-Christianization of the Restoration and the Romantic movement" (3:xi). 
Nora's model for the priest and soldier of the republican "memory nation," the 
historian Emest Lavisse, conceived his great Histoire de France as a deliberate 
attempt to "knit the garment of history rent by the French Revolution and create 
one seamless, synthetic nation: France and the Republic" (1:xix) and to use for 
that garment only unassailable archival documents. An archivally based history 
would make the case for France; "the general truth of the archive" would authen- 
ticate "the specific truth of the nation."30 
The case of Emest Lavisse recalls how unsatisfactory the distinction is between 
history and memory. Both Nora and, before him, Maurice Halbwachs take history 
to be a critical, desacralizing enterprise that exposes the discontinuities that col-
lective memories are designed to deny.31 Pim den Boer's substantial study of the 
discipline of history in nineteenth-century France, History as a Profession, sug-
gests why this distinction is not convincing. Boer demonstrates that public interest 
in history presupposed what is awkwardly translated as the "historicization of the 
29 See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London, 1991). pp. 197, 206. 
30 Pierre Nora, "Die 'Histoire de France' von Ernest Lavisse. Pietas Erga Patriam," in Zwischen 
Geschichte und Gedachmis (Berlin, 1990), p. 60. 
3' Nora, "General Introduction" (n. 11 above), 1:3; Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, p. 86. 
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worldview": "The world, culture, society, political organization-indeed every-
thing came to be seen as the effect of a historical process, as a development." 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Boer continues, "changes in social and 
political life were no longer considered deviations from the original order or rev- 
olutions of the eternal wheel of time; instead, they appeared to be significant and 
essential stages in a development that was generally described as progress." In 
other words, both the pertinence of historical study and the rise of memory cults 
presupposed a consciousness of how differences worked themselves out in history. 
The professionalization of history, set in motion by the state's 1818 decree that 
specialists teach history in royal and municipal lycCes, corresponded to growing 
interest in the particular case of France. Up until the nineteenth century, history 
had largely been taught through the works of Classical historians; thereafter, the 
demands of a growing readership for national history required closer attention to 
local color and archival sources-to the character of the case, as Chandler would 
put it.32 TO Augustin Thierry, "the real history of the country, the national, popular 
history" of France, remained hidden from view under "the courtier's cloak." What 
was needed was Walter Scott's "eagle-glances at the historical period," which 
anticipated Thierry's own historicist intentions to uncover "the general character- 
istics of the epoch," that is, "the different manners and mutual relations of the 
various classes of men."33 Boer honors the "historical method" of Thieny, and later 
of Lavisse and Charles Seignobos, scholars who resisted "opinions based on faith 
and tradition" in order to "observe people in action," and he condemns in a gra- 
tuitous, undeveloped aside their twentieth-century counterparts who allegedly cozy 
up to "dogmatic historical theories." In fact, Boer himself underplays the extent 
to which the critical method served the unmistakable political theme, "the growth," 
in his words, "of national unity and of durable institution^."^^ 
What Lavisse's Histoire de France, along with the school reader derived from 
it, the Petit Lavisse, and the popular children's book Le tour de la Francepar d e w  
enfants-"The Little Red Book of the Republic," as Jacques and Mona Ozouf 
cunningly describe the 1877 text-demonstrated was the degree to which society 
was scrutinized for its "nationness" and the nation and the national past came to 
be recognized in local places-in old buildings, marketplaces, and cathedrals and 
in rivers, forests, and hilltop^.^^ Of course, scrutiny was selective and suppressed 
particular versions of the past and identities that did not correspond to the nation; 
it bears repeating that remembering and forgetting are two sides of the same coin. 
"Pim den Boer, History as a Profession.. The Study of History in France, 1818-1914 (Prince-
ton, N.J., 1998), pp. 341-42. 
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Nonetheless, the claim for the substantiality of the public memory of the nation is 
strong. National memory corresponded to the wider commercial and public ex- 
changes that were taking place in the nineteenth century, to newly vitalized con- 
ceptions of political agency, and to the claims for popular enfranchisement that 
accompanied them. It provided emotionally resonant connections to otherwise bro- 
ken pasts and anonymous strangers. With this in mind, Rudy Koshar argues the 
German case for the perdurability of national memory work in his outstanding 
book Gemuzny's Transient Pasts. "Modernity's awful lightness, promoted by its 
unending production of societal resources outside experiential boundaries," Koshar 
explains, "has been countered, evoked, explained, and even facilitated by the na- 
tion's unbearable and enduring weight." The nation was surely constructed, and 
Koshar has no argument with this incontestable truth. But what does "constructed" 
actually mean? We are too happy simply to arrive at this insight; Koshar endeavors 
to sharpen its edge. "Nationalist speech makers, preservers of historic sites, and 
composers of national rhythms," he observes, "do not have unlimited scope to 
invent and manipulate cultural images." This is so because the point of national 
memory work is "to arouse remembrance per se rather than to remember something 
specific." Or, more precisely, the point was "to help the German people 'recognize 
itself'" and to see a "most natural connection" between past and present. National 
memory thus did little to encourage Germans "to remember specific events or 
injustices" such as Nazism. In this pathbreaking book, which follows important 
work by Celia Applegate and Alon Confino, Koshar demonstrates that citizens 
took great pleasure in the lavishness of the past and were accordingly reluctant to 
reflect on it c r i t i ~ a l l y . ~~  
Although Koshar suggests that in the 1970s and 1980s new commemorative 
cultures formed around the activism of women, trade unionists, and environmen- 
talists, as well as marginalized ethnic groups, all of whom began to search for the 
traces of "repressed or vaguely felt pastsM-activity, incidentally, that Nora rep- 
rimands for being "unpredictable and capricious"-the power of national memory 
is indisputable and is manifested again and again in its ability to keep other pasts 
and other renditions from articulating them~elves.~'  The simple, profound story 
that Sarah Farmer has to tell about Oradour and the death of the memory of death 
is a case in point. Martyred Village opens with the killing of 642 women, children, 
and men of Oradour-sur-Glane by German and French soldiers on June 10, 1944, 
just four days after the Allied invasion of Normandy, and concludes with the death, 
in March 1988, of Marguerite Rouffanche, the sole survivor of the massacre in the 
village church in which the women and children had been shut. These deaths mark 
how the memory of the dead shaped what became "the city of the dead." Among 
the martyred villages in France, Oradour not only lost the most citizens but also 
lost most of its citizens, and yet, Farmer argues, "the facts of the massacre, in and 
of themselves, [were not] sufficient to confer particular meaning to the site." What 
3b Koshar, pp. 8, 259, 331. See also Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German 
Idea of Heimut (Berkeley, Calif., 1990); and Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: 
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made Oradour such a congenial site for national commemoration was the uncer- 
tainty as to why the Germans targeted the town, one in which there had been no 
resistance activity. It did not fit into a specific chronology of events that dramatized 
the activity of the maquis,Vichy authorities, or German occupiers; it thus side- 
stepped politically contentious issues to "stand as a symbol for the suffering of 
France." The implicit message that "every French person, regardless of political 
choice or wartime activity, had been at r i s k  quickly governed the commemorative 
politics of the Fourth Republic. This led to gross distortions. So determined was 
official France to represent itself as victim that it could, on the one hand, compare 
the massacre at Oradour to the extermination of the Jews and, on the other, pardon 
those Alsatian soldiers who, serving with the Germans, supposedly against their 
will, had been convicted of participating in the massacre.38 
The amnesty vote in the National Assembly led the actual inhabitants of Ora- 
dour, who saw things quite differently than the politicians in Paris, to cut them- 
selves off from the rest of France, to recall all the killers, and to turn in on their 
sorrow: "from 1953 until the early 1960s there were no public activities or gath- 
erings: no first communions or baptisms, no weddings, no dances." Even the Com- 
munist politics of this poor municipality retreated in the face of a desperately sad 
culture of single-minded commemoration. But carried as it was by the friends and 
relatives of the dead, local memory eventually subsided as well. Old inhabitants 
died, and young people and newcomers rebuilt associational life and eventually 
fielded a champion football team. The ruins told other stories as well. On display 
were the personal effects of the dead, but whereas the identity or ration cards of 
the men "portray sudden, violent death," the toys, thimbles, buttons, and keys that 
had been in the pockets of the women and children said little about "the particular 
historical conditions of the war"; they "conjure up instead an innocent vision of a 
golden past." (Interestingly, the women's artifacts are more true to the official story 
of the Republic, with its emphasis on innocence; the men's lend more support to 
the local version, which recognizes complicity.) Moreover, new plaques on Ora- 
dour's streets indicate the professions and names of the former inhabitants. These 
old-time professions (e.g., clog maker, cooper, well digger) give "the sense not 
only of a lost town but of a lost epoch as well." And "as the ruins are eroded 
by rain and cold they become less a commentary on Nazi barbarism and more 
a general metaphor for broader notions of time, catastrophe, destruction and 
decay."3y 
The ruins are disappearing, and readers are left with final, material evidence for 
the perishability of memory. I think this is where Farmer wants to lead us, yet she 
also indicates the displacing forcefulness of official memory. In the first place, it 
was the French government, and particularly Charles de Gaulle-acknowledged 
here as "a master of constructing 'mobilizing myths,' "France's struggle in a "thirty 
years' war" with the Germans among them-that dramatized the massacre at Or- 
adour, a town that survivors otherwise might have rebuilt as they got on with their 
3Tarah Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane 
(Berkeley, Calif., 1999), pp. 55, 58. 
39 Ibid., pp. 178, 113, 193. 
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lives, as happened in other martyred villages. In the second place, the operations 
of national memory distorted the story that the people of Oradour wanted to tell, 
so that the role of all soldiers in the massacre got lost. The effect of the amnesty 
in 1953 was to displace Oradour altogether; in its insistently local version of events 
it cast itself off from the nation. In its loneliness, Oradour teetered between "the 
all of madness and the nothing of forgetting," refusing social integration until, one 
by one, the survivors died.40 Like the survivors of Vichy's deportation of French 
Jews or the veterans of France's forgotten war in Algeria, Oradour was mad ("no 
weddings, no dances") because it lived out what the nation had repressed, which 
was complicity. Oradour's trauma after 1953 revealed both the violence of national 
memory and, paradoxically, the urge to find a place in it, for to recognize oneself 
in national history was to resist the oblivion that is otherwise the fate of so many 
local memories. This is, I think, why Oradour took such pride when in 1970 its 
newly founded football club made it to the departmental championships; the town 
was no longer a place lost to hi~tory.~] 
For Oradour, 1953 was in some ways as traumatic as 1944, a state of affairs that 
indicates the gap between national memory and local memory, and the inhospitality 
of the one to the other. Historians have become increasingly aware of the vivacity 
of local and other vernacular memories, and they have criticized Nora for his 
single-minded focus on the nation and his assumption that it constituted the most 
natural, self-evident expression of French political life. On the basis of the record 
of American history, for example, John Bodnar sharply distinguishes official, or 
national, memory from popular memory.42 And Marita Sturken argues that "it is 
precisely the instability of memory forms," their fragmented, interiorized nature, 
that "allows for renewal and redemption" and resists official accounts.43 Indeed, 
the very poignancy that the domestic lives of contemporaries achieved in national 
narratives encouraged the generation of vernacular memories and counternarra- 
40 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore, 1996), p. 
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tives. Although national history has been a remarkably durable form that allows 
people to tell and share the history of their lives, it is not the only possible history. 
The events at Oradour attest to continuous, though uneasy traffic between local 
experiences and national understandings; they also tell of the (unresolved) need 
for local memory to find a place in national memory. 
In Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, Jay Winter makes a strong, eloquent 
claim on behalf of local communities of bereavement. He opens his book on post- 
World War I mourning with a description of J'accuse, Abel Gance's 1919 film 
about World War I. In a scene that was eventually scrapped, Gance conceived of 
a "supernatural menage a trois" in which the fallen war hero returned to live with 
his widow and her new husband. "All over Europe," Winter comments, "people 
had to live with the shadow of war" and had to learn to live with the dead. The 
imagined menage a trois suggested how important it was for the bereaved to find 
a place for the dead in their hearts and in their homes. Winter emphasizes this 
intimate sphere of commemoration, although he neglects to investigate further "the 
preservation in households of possessions, photographs, personal signatures of the 
dead." Commemoration was not an official or state act, and it did not perform a 
state claim on private bodies, Winter insists, as he puts Foucault back on the shelf: 
"that meaning was highly personal." The most poignant illustration of the private 
claims on the public was the massive disinterment of soldiers' bodies from battle- 
field cemeteries and their reburial in local graveyards. Only in France was rein- 
terment permitted, and an astonishing 40 percent of the 700,000 identified bodies 
went back home at state expense. The dead were reburied as the sons of fathers 
and mothers, not of the Fatherland.44 The war was remembered, Winter concludes 
in a related article, "overwhelmingly as an event in family history."45 
The commemorative activity of "adoptive kin" complemented that of family. 
Given the fact that the army of veterans and disabled was too large, and "the limits 
on state expenditures too restrictive," small groups organized to press their own 
interests, to husband their own resources, and to give their "adoptive kin" a "hand 
on the road to recovery."46 For Winter, this busy associational activity confirmed 
"the exuberance of civil society." What has gone unrecognized, he argues, is "the 
tendency of ordinary people to come together and to reflect publicly on what 
happened to them, to their loved ones, to their particular world, when war de- 
scended on their lives."47 While Winter does not replicate Bodnar's division be- 
tween the "dogmatic formalism" of official culture and the "complex or ambiguous 
terms" of "the real language of grief and sorrow," he privileges nonetheless private 
spheres and local places: this is where collective memory-"the sound of voices 
once heard by groups of people" who gather for a common purpose-operates. 
From the state, on the other hand, with its "bulky, rationalized, and hierarchical 
institutions," veterans and families could expect little support. Only "the scale of 
jdJay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sires of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge, 1995), pp. 144, 51, 94, 26. 
45 Jay Winter, "Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War," in 
Winter and Sivan, eds., p. 42. 
j6 Winter, Sires of Memory, Sires of Mourning, p. 44. 
47 Winter, "Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War," p. 41. 
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local action" was small enough to "give free range to the expression of sentiments 
of loss."48 Winter develops the tension between the ideals of the nation and the 
needs of the bereaved, but then lets it go slack. The years of remembrance even- 
tually followed "a path to recovery," and families picked up "the threads of their 
lives." In the end, Winter strikes the same elegiac note as Farmer: little remains 
of the "associative forms arduously constructed over the years by thousands of 
people, mostly obscure."49 
It is not unfair to say that Winter choreographs an escape from the nation and 
from history itself as he moves thousands of fallen soldiers from French battlefields 
to village graveyards and on to restful oblivion. His commentary on Kathe Koll- 
witz, for example, stresses the "timeless" aspect of bereavement: "there is no sig- 
nature of the artist, no indication of individual proprietorship, no location in time 
or space. Only sadness, the universal sadness, of two aged people, surrounded by 
the dead."50 This scene at the German war cemetery in Roggevelde (Belgium) is 
extremely important to Winter, for he wants to draw the attention of readers to the 
ordinary families that fought and survived the war and mourned its losses. (He 
does not consider how Kollwitz herself directed the move out of politics and into 
universals.) In Sites of Memory, Sites of Morning, and in War and Remembrance, 
a volume that Winter and Emmanuel Sivan edited, the accent is on "the exuberance 
of civil society" and on the ways in which vernacular remembering disassembled 
the political purposes of the national state. "The upheavals of this century have 
tended to separate individual memories from politically and socially sanctioned 
official versions of the past," Winter and Sivan conclude.51 The independence of 
vernacular meanings in the context of total war is a paradox that can be resolved: 
no other previous war had mobilized so many bodies or disrupted the lives of so 
many families as had World War I, and soldiers, workers, and the bereaved made 
powerful claims on the collective memory of the war in order to restore a measure 
of balance to their lives. Families moved around each other differently long after 
the armistice had been concluded-caring for disabled strangers, telling stories, 
and physically gesturing their affection^.^^ The lasting significance of Winter's 
work is to insist on remembering in private life and to make sensible the injuries 
to individual people. Telling the story of the trauma of twentieth-century war as a 
history of grieving families raises crucial questions about the self-evidence of 
personal experience, the unhealed wound of trauma, and the encompassing role of 
social narratives. 
However, the argument is not conclusive because the sight of the dead did not 
48 Bodnar, pp. 13-14; Winter, "Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the 
Great War," pp. 24, 33. 
49 Winter, "Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War," pp. 43, 
60. 
50 Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, p. 108. Winter's stress on "timelessness" is not 
careless: see pp. 53, 108, 113. 
5' Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, "Setting the Framework," in Winter and Sivan, eds. (n. 12 
above), p. 6. 
5 2  On this theme, see Elisabeth Domansky, "Militarization and Reproduction in World War I 
Germany," in Society, Culture and the State in Gennany, 1870-1930, ed. Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor, 
Mich., 1996). 
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automatically create a site of memory. Twentieth-century war, even by virtue of 
its industrial capacity and conscript armies, did not simply propel private lives onto 
public stages to contest "socially sanctioned" memories. Winter himself acknowl- 
edges the authority of "social scripts," which resisted innovation and routinely 
disallowed particular stories: the memories of Algerian veterans constitute one 
obvious example, those of the townspeople of Oradour another. In a closely ob- 
served analysis of Armistice Day ceremonies in Britain, Adrian Gregory concludes 
that "the civilian bereaved always came first in any clash of interests" with ex- 
servicemen. To privilege the "soldier's experience" by listening to his pain and 
anger necessarily "engendered a terrible callousness towards the feelings of the 
bereaved," whose sacrifices needed to be made meaningful. Even after the out- 
pouring of bitter, fictionalized renditions of the war in the late 1920s, the nation 
provided the most enduring narratives by which families could make sense of their 
losses.53 Antoine Prost is also impressed by the common choreography of Armi- 
stice Day in France. That almost every town in France built a monument to the 
fallen says as much about the strong hand of the republic in guiding commemo- 
rative practices as it does about the numbers of young men killed. What "set it 
apart from all other republican ceremonies," argues Prost, was that Armistice Day 
"celebrated not abstract principles but concrete citizens . . . the occasion was not 
to honor the fatherland . . . it was the fatherland that honored its citizens." Prost 
is at pains to keep readers from misunderstanding the ceremonies of the dead as 
jingoistic, and he wants to uphold a common republican frame. Whereas Winter 
stresses the "highly personal," Prost privileges the virtuous public, in which a 
"single collective actor" spoke the "impersonal rhetoric" of a "republican cult." 
Prost, like Nora, cherishes the unisonality of the Third Republic. Verdun, he writes, 
marks the "apogee of nineteenth-century patriotism," a moment when men endured 
"conditions that have become unimaginable" and did so out of "inward consent." 
War at the end of the twentieth century, by contrast, threatened humankind as a 
whole, not France itself, and therefore did not call upon national duty. The impli- 
cation is that World War I and the Third Republic tended to be mutually reinforc- 
ing, patriotism making the sacrifices imaginable and the losses in turn strength- 
ening the republic. Although Prost wishes away the petty, conspirational 
atmosphere that corrupted French politics in the 1930s and culminated in paralysis 
in 1940, he makes the useful point that wartime memories sought out the narrative 
of the nation.54 I wonder whether war and its remembrance were not ways for 
ordinary people to perform otherwise unavailable public roles. Modern war may 
well have made attractive and pertinent collective national myths, even as the vast 
scale and brutal aspect of the fighting generated thousands of disillusioned coun- 
ternarratives. Indeed, post- 1945 national identities in Europe are in large part sus- 
tained through memories of World War II.55 In light of the exemplary studies by 
53  Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919-1946 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 51, 
120-21, 226-27. 
5d Antoine Prost, "Monuments to the Dead," in Nora, ed. (n. 11 above), 2:323-24, 329-30; 
Prost, "Verdun," in Nora, ed., 3:401. 
5 5  See, e.g., Tony Judt, "The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," 
Daedalus 121 (1992): 83-118. 
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Winter, Prost, and Gregory, it seems clear that the memory of the war achieved its 
eloquence partly as a private matter but also as a public performance, and it de- 
pended as much on silence as articulation. 
Catherine Meidale's incisive discussion of "war, death, and remembrance in 
Soviet Russia" in the Winter and Sivan volume is a superb illustration of the 
difficulty private memories had speaking for themselves and the ease with which 
they were contaminated by national projects of remembrance. There is unques- 
tionable poignancy about the "proscribed memories" of the Stalin era-"tales of 
arrest, disappearance, lost parents, orphans" that were "kept alive as family secrets, 
private narratives rehearsed in kitchens." But, Memdale argues, "family secrets" 
crumbled at the touch: not only did the state destroy photographs, bum letters and 
diaries, and make it dangerous for relatives to safeguard what had become state's 
evidence but in addition "personal grief had no wider framework, no mirror in 
which to observe itself." Although Memdale does not quite want to say it, poten- 
tially subversive memories of the Stalin years seem to have vanished easily without 
witnesses to give them credence or narratives to provide them structure. Indeed, 
there was almost no public memory of Russia's horrific experience of mass death 
in World War I, blocked as it was by the revolution. There were no Russian equiv- 
alents of the veterans' groups, war memorials, and gestures of remembering that 
are the subjects of so many of the books under review here. A larger point that 
Merridale does not consider is how Stalinism, and its ambition to engineer human 
souls, made available techniques of subjective understanding and remembrance 
and encouraged autobiographical writings that, for all their political excisions and 
literary conventions, generated a resonant sense of self that was no less sincere for 
being Soviet.56 The remembering, scrutinizing self is itself a historical and, in part, 
Soviet composition. Nonetheless, Merridale helpfully draws attention to the par- 
ticular ability of public narratives to provide some expression to individual trag- 
edies: private memories of Stalinism could be "preserved, though partially," she 
writes, whenever "state-sponsored ceremonial sank hungry roots into the deep well 
of historic pain and loss." For example, "the woman whose husband had disap- 
peared in 1937 (and who had nonetheless given all her energies to the war effort 
for five years) could bring her grief, if not a story about it, to the solemn meetings 
in May every year as easily as her neighbor, the war widow." Along the margins, 
"groups which were excluded or overlooked" cultivated "counter memories in the 
very shadow of the official history."57 
The implication of Memdale's research is that even the most traumatic personal 
memories had difficulty finding terms of articulation when they were not spoken 
56 Catherine Memdale, "War, Death, and Remembrance in Soviet Russia." in Winter and Sivan, 
eds., pp. 63, 75. See also Jochen Hellbeck, "Laboratories of the Soviet Self: Diaries from the 
Stalin Era" (Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 1998); and Igal Halfin, "From Darkness to Light: 
Student Communist Autobiography during NEP," Jahrbiicher f ir  Geschichte Osteuropas 45 
(1997): 210-36. 
57 Memdale, pp. 75-77, 79. On memories under state socialist regimes, see also Svetlana 
Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge, 1994); Iwona Irwin- 
Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory (New Brunswick, N.J., 
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for by more embracing-and selective-national renditions. At the same time, 
individual selves did find means of expression through public narratives. The na- 
tion, in particular, can be usefully thought of as a memory system that enabled 
individuals to recognize their lives in nonrepeatable, historical time. Because of 
their boundedness in time and space, national narratives have an unusual ability 
to organize remembrance and to make the past sensible. The nation's capacity to 
represent the messiness of daily life in meaningful and transparent terms is exactly 
what Nora and his collaborators cherish. It is such a valuable object because the 
imaginary ties among the individuals of a national cohort have made it possible 
for social groups to act and to dream for themselves a better or different future. 
With its emphasis on collective virtue, guilt, and crime, its melodramatic emplot- 
ment, so to speak, the national narrative has provided the machinery for all sorts 
of social action. Although these dreams are not necessarily peaceful, Nora ex- 
presses a palpable nostalgia for the robust political projects that civic nationalism 
enabled at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the same time, the very 
forcefulness of the representational powers of the nation have worked to disable 
other narratives-those of the silenced veterans in Gregory's account, for example, 
or of the widows of the disappeared in Merridale's. Contesting the narrative of the 
nation, the partial recuperation of these marginal stories is a declaration of inde- 
pendence, a resolve to fashion new political affinities. 
The history of private life and the historical conditions that make it possible for 
people to reflect on their sense of self, to fashion their own interior spaces, and to 
speak up for themselves has yet to be written. We know little about the historical 
circumstances that encourage practices of personal remembering and vernacular 
commemoration. Terdiman, for one, suggests that the nineteenth-century "memory 
crisis" entangled the way even private people regarded and reconstructed their 
personal pasts. A growing literature on subjectivity focuses on the appearance of 
highly personal narratives in which subjects picked at the thread of their lives from 
the larger fabric of their time and place.58 Diaries, memoirs, and autobiographies 
are all self-reflective forms that were invigorated at the end of the eighteenth 
century. At the same time, the ability to picture oneself, to make determinations 
about bad or good luck and about the work of social forces, and to make a case 
for oneself, needs to be understood historically. "Peoples are not always subjects 
constantly confronting history as some academics would wish," Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot astutely observes; "the capacity upon which they act to become subjects 
is always part of their condition. This subjective capacity ensures confusion be- 
cause it makes human beings doubly historical or, more properly, fully historical. 
It engages them simultaneously in the sociohistorical process and in narrative con- 
structions about that process."5y By remembering and telling stories about them- 
5R See, e.g., Jerome Hamilton Buckley, The Turning Key: Autobiography and the Subjective 
Impulse since 1800 (Cambridge, 1984); Laqueur (n. 26 above), pp. 176-204; Carolyn Steedman, 
Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interioriq, 1780-1930 (London, 1995), 
Past Tenses: Essays on Writing, Autobiography, and Histoty (London, 1992); and Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). 
59 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, 
1995), p. 24. 
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selves, subjects distinguished between the "I then" and the "I now" and between 
the self and society and therefore thought of themselves as acting and as being 
acted upon. In many ways, this capacity to picture oneself recapitulates the method 
of historicism in which the specificity of the case is associated with structures of 
periodicity. In other words, the remembering self should be regarded as a historical 
rather than transcendental subject. It is an entity formed by the practices of social 
life and does not stand ready-made on its outskirts. Highly original studies by 
Carolyn Steedman, Annette Kuhn, and Marianne Hirsch examine the work of 
memory in private life and reflect on the historical nature of the self-consciousness 
of the individual. 
"When I first came across Kathleen Woodward's Jipping Street," writes Carolyn 
Steedman about a 1928 memoir of working-class life at the end of the nineteenth 
century, "I read it with the shocked astonishment of one who had never seen what 
she knows written down before." Steedman's astonishment is the forceful recog- 
nition that "what she knows" is not a general condition but (to use Chandler's 
words) a specific (political) case that can be "written down"; it is knowledge about 
the shared particulars of time and place that invites reflection. The moment is 
familiar because Steedman recognizes herself in the contours of someone else's 
life, but unfamiliar as well because Steedman sees herself in a new way, in the 
stream of historical time. In an exceptional book, Annette Kuhn suggests how this 
work of picturing proceeded in the development of her own political subjectivity. 
Looking at the composition of old family photographs is a practice of revealing 
stories, she writes: "Ways of knowing and ways of seeing the world" that "are 
rarely acknowledged . . . in the expressions of hegemonic culture." In a riveting 
look at a picture of "young Annette" dressed up on the occasion of Queen Eliza- 
beth's coronation on June 2, 1953, Kuhn weaves together the history of family, 
class, and empire. "Fussy and overdecorated," Annette's fancy frock was hand- 
made by her mother, one piece among the many that announced the scrimped 
economy of the family: Kuhn's wardrobe consisted of clothes too small because 
they were worn an extra year, or too large in order to last for years to come, or 
too standard (the seven-year-old's coronation dress was cut from the same pattern 
of the dress she had worn at a wedding when she was five). Indeed, fashion gave 
historical circumstances particular legibility; both Kuhn and Steedman dwell on 
how well clothes expressed various class renditions of the ever-changing postwar 
"new look." That Annette's mother dressed her up on Coronation Day also indi- 
cated the value working-class families placed on a "well turned out" child. Cor- 
onation Day reflected hopes for a more prosperous life in the postwar years and 
longing for "attachment to larger ties: community, nation, Empire." By reading 
photographs for the settings they stage, and for the dramas about girlhood, class, 
and empire they enact, Kuhn musters the ability to resist the wider claims of 
allegiance and virtue they represent. "The loyalty, the wish to belong, claimed in 
the outward display of a ceremonial dress and a photograph of it are riven with 
disenchantment," Kuhn concludes; "a daughter disappoints, an Empire crumbles." 
Such a radical position, Kuhn implies, would not be possible without an awareness 
of the "relations of class, national identity, and gender," which facilitate not a 
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timeless but a "timeful," contingent, and historically situated reading60 Historians 
would do well to consider these private archives more carefully and to write his- 
tories of the uses of photography, the idea of home, and the subversive play in the 
attic that give them definition. They suggest ways in which historical consciousness 
is personal as well as collective. 
Photography plays such a large part in the work of memory because it elaborated 
a commemorative culture that permitted the family to think of itself in historical 
terms. Kuhn's father worked as a semiprofessional photographer, selling his ser- 
vices door-to-door and undoubtedly sharpening his daughter's keen eye, but snap- 
shots, photographs, and photo albums were commonplace items in working-class 
homes; in this respect Kuhn's household was not exceptional. An irrepressible 
Pierre Bourdieu goes so far as to say that "photographic practice only exists and 
subsists for most of the time by virtue of its familyfinction or rather by the function 
conferred upon it by the family group, namely that of solemnizing and immortal- 
izing the high points of family life."61 At the same time, photographs documented 
the perishability of its subjects. "The photograph's seizing of a moment always, 
even in that very moment, assumes loss," notes Kuhn: "The record looks toward 
a future time when things will be different, anticipates a need to remember what 
will soon be past."62 In this view, photography is the very expression of Terdiman's 
"memory crisis," at once creating a documentary record of the past to fashion a 
sense of continuity and performing the anxiety about the durability and authenticity 
of the connections that have been established. 
In a remarkable study, Marianne Hirsch explores more closely the way in which 
commemorative practices and particularly photography have shaped the family's 
sense of itself. Like Kuhn, Hirsch recognizes that photographs depict the ideology 
of family. The dresses, the poses, and the spatial arrangements among the subjects 
represent relations of power in the family to reveal "the family's unconscious 
optics." But Hirsch is also interested in the way that photographs create "post- 
memory," which Hirsch defines as "the experience of those who grow up domi- 
nated by narratives that preceded their birth." She is particularly concerned with 
stories of trauma such as those that have emerged from the Holocaust. Photographs 
give plain evidence of the lives that have been destroyed; they are "an enduring 
'umbilical' connection" to a past life. Even as "they affirm the past's existence," 
however, "their flat two-dimensionality" signals the past's "unbridgeable distance." 
As Hirsch develops her analysis, memory work hovers uncertainly between the 
poles of loss and recovery. If photographic arrangements such as those introduced 
by Kuhn allow the individual to find her own way out of the shadows of expectation 
and proprietorship, the photo albums Hirsch studies end up repairing ruptures of 
"emigration and exile, of death and loss." "In reunifying a fractured personal his- 
60 Carolyn Kay Steedman, Landscape fora Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives (London, 1986), 
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Quoted in Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cam-
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tory," Hirsch confesses, "I may forgo the possibility of a radical break, but I resist 
a discontinuity that has also become coercive." Thus, the displacements that the 
camera exposes in family placements are the building blocks to a creative fash- 
ioning of self along lines of continuity and d i s~ont inu i ty .~~  
Hirsch associates postmemory with "postmodern subjectivity," which is shaped 
"in relation to an elsewhere," to "a temporal/spatial diaspora," but the contempo- 
rary moment she describes is more prolonged than she allow^.^ The stories about 
loss, exile, and identity that Hirsch and Kuhn unravel reveal operations of an 
exuberant culture of commemoration that is at the heart of modern subjectivity. 
By placing themselves into historical time, autobiographers and their readers, and 
photographers and their subjects, defined themselves in relation to an elsewhere 
and an elsewhen and made loss a significant source in the composition of the self. 
The narratives they created were case studies of the determinations of time and 
place, and thus a product of nineteenth-century historical consciousness. In this 
way, personal acts of remembering relied on general structures of temporality; texts 
in the private sphere were in large part constituted by the texture of the public 
sphere. 
In an extremely important and as yet underappreciated book about "myth, ritual, 
and the quest for family values," John Gillis explores the origins of these private 
histories. Whereas middle-class families in Britain and the United States had shown 
little concern about their origins before the nineteenth century, after 1800 a feeling 
of having been ravaged by time turned "living rooms into family portrait galleries" 
and "attics into archive^."^^ "What sets our age apart," he continues, "is that each 
family is now the creator and custodian of its own myths, rituals, and images."66 
Historians of private life concur: the early nineteenth century witnessed an explo- 
sion of autobiographical writing, diary keeping, scrapbook pasting, and portrait 
taking. Families took more care to commemorate personal occasions such as birth- 
days, holidays, and Christmas. Memories were "hoarded like capital," summarizes 
Anne Mar t i n -F~g i e r .~~  Acts of remembering (and forgetting) created the romance 
of the family, always shoring up the power relations of family ideology-it was 
usually women who guarded over memory, for example-but also constituting the 
family as a social entity and an active subject. 
Gillis opens up enormously productive ways to think about the history of the 
private sphere and individual subjectivity. He does nothing less than fill in the 
personal side to the historicist imagination, which after 1800 enabled more and 
more Europeans to recognize themselves in the boundedness of time and place and 
thus to see themselves as a "case" that corresponded to a distinct, historically 
situated identity. Any number of subject positions could be elaborated, as the "case 
63 Hirsch, pp. 11, 22-23, 192, 214. 
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study" method encouraged narrative expositions both of national culture and of 
individual subjectivity. What is perhaps troubling in this account is the privileged 
status of narrative, which seems to invalidate experience as such and to brush aside 
the nontextual reality of pain and poverty. The ways in which experience might 
speak for itself or disrupt narrative will remain a hotly debated question. However, 
the ultimate challenge of the works under review here is to advance the argument 
that a history of subjectivity is very much a history of representation. As Trouillot 
argues, one part of experience is the capacity to see oneself acting and thereby to 
assume or identify with a particular subject position. A fully narrativized world is 
extremely rich precisely because it produces so many ideas about acting on and 
transforming material conditions. Historical narratives are disconcerting as well 
because they are inherently unstable and contain their own "disruptions, lacunae, 
conflicts, irreparable losses, belated recognitions, and challenges to identity."68 
They offer possibilities for acting in the world, but they withhold a sense of se- 
curity. 
An unusually sophisticated body of work on trauma directly engages the question 
of the status of experience and the authority of narrative. While this scholarship 
focuses on extreme, boundary events such as the Holocaust, and is generally ahis- 
torical, it highlights the general capacity of narrative structures to integrate expe- 
rience or stimuli in an understandable, orderly fashion. Trauma is originally a 
Greek word meaning "wound," but in contemporary medical and psychiatric lit- 
erature, summarizes Cathy Caruth, "the term trauma is understood as a wound 
inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind." It breaches "the mind's experience 
of time, self, and the world" and manifests itself in the nonsymbolic realm of 
dreams or flashback^.^^ In this conception, an event is traumatic not because it is 
horrible, although it may well be, but because it cannot be assimilated by the 
individual's view of the world. Trauma is therefore taken to be an affront to un- 
derstanding. Not surprisingly, it invites the attention of the therapist "to whom the 
traumatized subject can bear witness, and thus integrate narratively what was until 
then an assailing specter."70 But it also attracts the attention of scholars who see 
trauma as something that eludes the conventions of knowledge and thereby per- 
forms an odd freedom beyond literary narratives and social sanctions. Depending 
on the postmodern proclivities of the investigator, trauma is regarded either as an 
unmediated, literal manifestation of an event, and thus as a guarantor of the veracity 
of what is otherwise incomprehensible, or as a sign of the impossibility of full 
knowledge. While these are not incompatible positions, they are useful in different 
ways. 
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For Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, scholars engaged with the Holocaust and 
its aftermath, the ragged edges of testimony, the "bits and pieces of a memory that 
has been overwhelmed," articulate the exceptional trauma of the experience; what 
cannot be said is as eloquent as what happened.71 Cathy Caruth, who has perhaps 
explored the concept most widely, readjusts her focus. Trauma, she argues, "opens 
up and challenges us to a new kind of listening, the witnessing, precisely, of im-
possibility." In difficult cross-cultural interactions, the mutually shared suspicion 
of not being able to understand a traumatic event "may provide the very link 
between cultures: not as a simple understanding of the past of others, but . . . 
through the departures we have all taken from ourselves."72 In this gap between 
consciousness and memory, the encounter with the strange and the shocking leaves 
open the opportunity for innovation. In his essay "Against Consolation," Martin 
Jay reflects on Walter Benjamin's deployment of shock and trauma to contest the 
smooth operations of bourgeois culture. By "not letting the dead rest in peace," 
unwilling to make sense of his friends' antiwar suicides in 1914 in terms of "sac- 
rifice, atonement, and reconciliation," Benjamin "assumed the guise of the 'de- 
structive character' who wanted to blast open the seemingly progressive continuum 
of history, reconstellating the debris in patterns that would somehow provide 
flashes of insight into the redemptive potential hidden behind the official narra- 
t i ~ e . " ~ ~In other words, explains Kevin Newmark in an allied essay, traumatized 
memory is "the site where change can be produced" because "no one system or 
process of experience can ever sufficiently ensure that all foreign elements will 
merely 'expire."' Memory work recuperates the squandered potential of moder- 
nity: it is "the place where the wholly unexpected and accidental can now happen 
to the subject, making it into something different or other than it previously was, 
as was in fact the case when 'modernity' occurred historically to interrupt once 
and for all the unified structure of what we continue to call 'traditional' experi-
e n ~ e . " ~ ~Once again, memory cultures are associated with the breaks and innova- 
tions of modernity, with its debris-like nature. 
I find this work extremely suggestive, and recent collections edited by Cathy 
Caruth; by Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer; as well as by Winter and 
Sivan are significant interdisciplinary contributions. Taken as a whole, they explore 
the ways in which individual memory resists the "smooth continuity between past 
and present" and stays outside socially sanctioned narratives. Memory records 
traces of the unspeakable, the matters that official narratives cannot or will not 
recognize. Sarah Farmer's study of the townspeople of Oradour and Annette 
Kuhn's interrogation of herself are good examples of the dissonant memories that 
get screened out by the accepted version of events but are not completely lost. In 
71 Shoshana Felman, "Education and Crises, or the Vicissitudes of Teaching," in Trauma: Ex-
plorations in Memov, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore, 1995), pp. 16-17. See also Felman and Don 
Laub, Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (London, 1991). 
7 2  Cathy Caruth, "Trauma and Experience: Introduction," in Caruth, ed., pp. 10-11. 
73 Martin Jay, "Against Consolation: Walter Benjamin and the Refusal to Mourn," in Winter 
and Sivan, eds. (n. 12 above), pp. 228-29. 
74 Kevin Newmark, "Traumatic Poetry: Charles Baudelaire and the Shock of Laughter," in 
Caruth, ed., p. 238. 
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the case of traumatic events, memories may "remain in the body: in each of the 
senses, in the heart that races and skin that crawls."75 Whether or not that biological 
residence makes the event true or lends it particular veracity remains an open 
question, however. Likewise, it is not clear whether the debris to which Jay refers 
or the leftover "foreign" memories in Newmark's account are actually "unclaimed 
experience" or simply unclaimed story lines. Dominick LaCapra, for example, 
warns against the hypostatization of experience as "the source of authenticity or 
authority." Indeed, he questions the assumption that the narratives that give lives 
order and meaning are "somehow less authentic than what is argued to lie be- 
neath."76 What unsettles LaCapra is how quickly preoccupation with fragmentation 
and trauma leads scholars to the unjustifiable step of taking the insufficiency of 
integrative mechanisms to be the expression of their invalidity. With this step, 
"history is marginalized in the interest of History as trauma indiscriminately writ 
large." LaCapra barely contains his impatience with critics such as Lawrence 
Langer who seem to resist the opportunity of reconstituting the life of injured 
victim, even in a limited way, convinced as they are that the integrity of the life 
narrative that such a reconstitution would require has been wholly destroyed. 
LaCapra finds the intellectual choice that results frighteningly restrictive: "the 
phantasm of total mastery, full ego-identity, [and] 'totalitarian' social integration," 
on the one hand, or "acting out repetition compulsions with endless fragmentation, 
aporias, and double-binds, on the other." What is left untheorized is "the possibility 
of working through in which totalization . . . is actively resisted and the repetition- 
compulsion c~unte rac ted ."~~  LaCapra thereby joins a growing number of com- 
mentators for whom the fascination with trauma and historical disaster is an aes- 
thetization of incommensurability and separateness, a Balkanization of experience 
that countermands the vexing obligations of acculturation and acc~mrnoda t ion .~~  
There is a commonsense association of trauma with the ills of the modem world. 
Freud first associated trauma with industrial accidents in the nineteenth century 
and elaborated his comments in acknowledgment of the neuroses generated by 
World War I. Auschwitz and Hiroshima fully disclosed the catastrophic potential 
of modernity. In this regard, one of the manifestations of the catastrophic age is 
taken to be the insufficiency, even the illegitimacy, of narrative. However, what is 
left undeveloped in these accounts is the loss of what has been displaced: the life 
narratives that "recount a history, reconstruct a sense of agency, and rebuild a 
life."79 The accent usually falls on the extremity of conditions and the impossibility 
of understanding. Yet the traumatic response can also be seen as the very measure 
of the authority that narratives had once assumed in the lives of individual subjects. 
75 Susan J. Brison, "Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self," in Bal et al., eds., p. 42. 
76 Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1994), pp. 196, 200. 
77 LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz, pp. 45-46, 11 1. 
78 See, e.g., Charles Maier, "A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy, and 
Denial," History and Memory 5 (1993): 136-51; Wachtel (n. 8 above), pp. 237-45; Michael 
AndrC Bernstein, Foregone Conclusions: Against Apocalyptic History (Berkeley, Calif., 1994); 
and Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston, 1999). 
79 LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust, p. 196. 
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Langer, for example, contrasts "modem identity," citing the philosopher Charles 
Taylor's description of "the sense of inwardness, freedom, [and] individuality," 
with "the diminished self" of Holocaust survivors. As we have seen, Langer is 
harshly criticized by LaCapra for taking this opposition to be a characteristic of 
the modern condition, yet by yoking together "modem identity" and the "dimin- 
ished self' he also hints at the affinity between the historically specific circum- 
stances in which modem identity is cultivated and the trauma that is the unexpected 
negation of that c~l t iva t ion.~~ aIt is worth considering whether trauma is &elf 
historical case, a manifestation of the social narratives by which modem subjects 
move about in historical time. 
The keen interest in the case of trauma is an apt illustration of the final case that 
needs to be resolved: the recent proliferation of studies of memory and remem- 
bering. There are logical reasons why historians should be interested in memory. 
This century has mobilized and uprooted unprecedented millions of people, ex- 
posing them to history. "Modem warfare is a potent generator of memories," ex- 
plains Memdale: "The involvement of every citizen, the unaccustomed collec- 
tivities, the emergencies and shock, the loss, the private totems and shared 
superstitions leave indelible prints on the imaginati~n."~~ At the same time, the 
"organized oblivion" of totalitarian dictatorships in which a single narrative was 
imposed has made the study of remembering and forgetting an important part of 
the reconstruction of posttotalitarian civil society.82 The very "exuberance of civil 
society," as Jay Winter puts it, has generated a plurality of memories. The condi- 
tions of globalization, the impact of the media, the extent of migrations have gen- 
erated cultural hybrids and new stories worldwide. The consequence of what Arjun 
Appadurai calls "modemity at large" at the end of the twentieth century has been 
to throw into doubt the centrality of the nation-state as an organizer of social 
meanings and to question the logic of assimilation. A veritable publishing industry 
around Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck examines the posttraditional aspect to 
late modernity in which individuals have been largely "disembedded" from social 
milieus such as neighborhood, religion, ethnicity, and even family. They find less 
applicable the experience that those milieus had transmitted as people move about 
among a variety of social settings, and, as a result, quite self-consciously construct 
morally autonomous life traject~ries.~~ The validation of these new subject posi- 
tions requires a recognition of the plurality of memories, the crosshatch of scars. 
The next step is small but audacious: the view that history and memory are 
narrative systems designed to fashion active subjects invites historians to admit 
Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven, Conn., 
1991), pp. 198-203. Italics added. 
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their own complicity in those systems and to take up what Nora has identified as 
their roles as soldiers and priests. Nora celebrates the collective action that the 
case of the nation enabled at the beginning of the century, and he has not entirely 
given up hope for the possibility of a community bounded by remembrance that 
is able to act collectively. The presentness of the past in the former Yugoslavia and 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe exerts such horrified fascination on Western observers 
not least because it indicates the possibilities for creating new allegiances and new 
meanings. In her absorbing book The Political Lives of the Dead, for example, 
Katherine Verdery makes a case for studying postsocialist politics and the impor- 
tance attached to "political symbolism, life experiences, and feelings" in order to 
come up with a "more enchanted view of politics." The politics of the dead in 
Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia have created "a newly meaningful universe," 
one which is deeply disturbing, but alluring for the fact of innova t i~n .~~  Dead 
bodies, Verdery explains, lend themselves to endeavors to rethink the boundaries 
of the community. Reburials of notables such as Hungary's Irnre Nagy, the Greek 
Catholic bishop Inochentie Micu, and Serbia's World War I1 dead identified very 
particular ancestries and created explicit zones of inclusion and exclusion. Ex- 
emplary autobiographies of suffering and victimhood, Verdery argues, made the 
case for the newly vitalized nation. While all lives are contradictory and polyse- 
mous, the corpses that constituted the material evidence of those lives "have a 
single name and a single body," and they thus "present the illusion of having only 
one significance." The "political work  of dead bodies in Eastern Europe, Verdery 
concludes, "is to institute ideas about morality by assessing accountability and 
punishment, to sanctify space anew, to redefine the temporalities of daily life, to 
line people up with alternative ancestors and thereby to reconfigure the commu- 
nities people participate in."85 In similar fashion the narratives of loss and displace- 
ment that Kuhn and Hirsch trace contribute to new life trajectories and to a kind 
of enchantment. And, finally, the interest in trauma can only be fully explained by 
a willingness to let the guise of the "destructive character" contest the imperatives 
of the present and the authority of its official narratives with evidence of the strange 
and incomprehensible. 
The innovations of memory work rely in large part on a consciousness of and 
identification with loss, a disorientation in modernity that encourages new rounds 
of self-reflection and self-assertion in the troubled space of time. From Hegel to 
Hobsbawm, modem testimony insists on seeing it like this: "everything is becom- 
ing so different."86 It sets the stage for thinking about the world in secondhand 
terms of rupture and repair, of displacement and resettlement, of disconnection 
and remembrance. It is attention to the discontinuities of the social world that 
84 Verdery (n. 6 above), pp. 126-27. 
85 Ibid., pp. 29, 127. 
86 What I regard as the signature phrase of the modem is Johannes von Muller's, a noted 
historian who writes to his brother about his astonishment at the French Revolution. See his letter 
of May 20, 1797, in Johannes von Muller, Briefe in Auswahl, ed. Edgar Bonjour (Basel, 1954), 
p. 212. On Hegel, see Perry Anderson, A Zone of Engagement (New York, 1992), p. 293; other- 
wise, see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (New York, 1995). 
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makes available new subjectivities such as the nation. That national memories, in 
particular, remain so resonant in Yugoslavia and elsewhere is not because they are 
more true, but because the narratives of collective guilt and collective victimization 
they generate have the effect of recognizing and commemorating individual suf- 
fering in socially meaningful, if tendentious, ways. Thus, the nation has been the 
dominant form that historical consciousness has taken. Set against an imaginary 
(or future) age that does not acknowledge loss or the possibility of recovery and 
does not approach the past with anguished concern or see in it a fragile otherness, 
the modem case seems remarkable for its investment in memory and the violence 
of its excisions, for the album of photographs that lies in the trash. 
